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Abstract
Global health organizations frequently set disease-specific targets with the goal of eliciting adop-
tion at the national-level; consideration of the influence of target setting on national policies,
programme and health budgets is of benefit to those setting targets and those intended to respond.
In 2014, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS set ‘ambitious’ treatment targets for
country adoption: 90% of HIV-positive persons should know their status; 90% of those on treat-
ment; 90% of those achieving viral suppression. Using case studies from Ghana and Uganda, we
explore how the target and its associated policy content have been adopted at the national level.
That is whether adoption is in rhetoric only or supported by programme, policy or budgetary
changes. We review 23 (14 from Ghana, 9 from Uganda) national policy, operational and strategic
documents for the HIV response and assess commitments to ‘90–90–90’. In-person semi-structured
interviews were conducted with purposively sampled key informants (17 in Ghana, 20 in Uganda)
involved in programme-planning and resource allocation within HIV to gain insight into factors
facilitating adoption of 90–90–90. Interviews were transcribed and analysed thematically, induc-
tively and deductively, guided by pre-existing policy theories, including Dolowitz and Marsh’s pol-
icy transfer framework to describe features of the transfer and the Global Health Advocacy and
Policy Project framework to explain observations. Regardless of notable resource constraints,
transfer of the 90–90–90 targets was evident beyond rhetoric with substantial shifts in policy and
programme activities. In both countries, there was evidence of attempts to minimize resource con-
straints by seeking programme efficiencies, prioritization of programme activities and devising
domestic financing mechanisms; however, significant resource gaps persist. An effective health
network, comprised of global and local actors, mediated the adoption and adaptation, facilitating a
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9
shift in the HIV programme from ‘business as usual’ to approaches targeting geographies and
populations.
Keywords: Policy analysis, HIV, UNAIDS, targets, networks
Introduction
The establishment of global health targets, intended for adoption at
the national level, seeks to focus the attention of funders,
implementers and national-level policy-makers. Setting of targets or
goals has occurred in global health since the late 1950s with the
global Smallpox Eradication Programme, but has become increas-
ingly commonplace, spanning multiple health issues, as evidenced
by the Millennium Development Goals and subsequent Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations; Shiffman and Smith
2007). The HIV response alone has had numerous, arguably ambi-
tious, targets: ‘3 by 5’ to treat three million people living with HIV
(PLHIV) by 2005; ‘15 by 15’ to treat 15 million PLHIV by 2015;
‘getting to zero’ for zero new HIV infections, zero AIDS-related
deaths and zero discrimination by 2015 (World Health
Organization 2003; UNAIDS 2011, 2015). In 2014, the Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) set the ‘90–
90–90’ targets that operationalize what countries need to do, and
what programme coverage targets need to be attained at certain
time points, to achieve the policy goal of ending the AIDS epidemic
by 2030, as advocated for in the SDGs (UNAIDS 2014; Stover et al.
2016) (Box 1). The 90–90–90 targets differ from previous targets,
such as 3 by 5; rather than being set arbitrarily, mathematical mod-
elling has accompanied the 90–90–90 targets, utilized to derive the
programme coverage levels and estimate the resource needs for
achieving the policy goal of ending the AIDS epidemic by 2030
(Stover et al. 2016). Similar strategies have been developed using
modelling for the epidemics of malaria and tuberculosis (TB) (Stop
TB Partnership 2015; World Health Organization 2015).
Whilst HIV programmes in many sub-Saharan African countries
are well established, and have achieved tremendous scale up in
access to antiretroviral treatment (ART) in the past decade, the 90–
90–90 targets have been met with scepticism, and even criticism, for
being over ambitious (Katabira and Oelrichs 2007; El-Sadr et al.
2012; Sidibe´ et al. 2016). The utilization of mathematical modelling
for informing programme decisions across a range of countries, such
as the analysis accompanying the 90–90–90 targets and the policy
goal to end AIDS necessitates generalization of intervention costs
and impact. Most mathematical modelling studies, such as this, do
Key Messages
• Transfer of the 90–90–90 targets, and associated policy goals and content, was evident in both rhetoric and action in
both countries despite substantial resource and capacity constraints potentially faced in both settings; transfer was
mediated by a well-coordinated network of global and local actors with little to no notable opposition among the parties
engaged.
• There are a number of domestic financing plans in the pipeline to support progression to the 90–90–90 targets, but
whether these can be established successfully and finances realized in the timeframe are unknown.
• Both countries continue to be in favour of ambitious health targets to help galvanize action and leadership, however,
informants at the country level felt strongly that recognition for progress should be equally valued to target attainment
given variability in baseline performance and that there should be greater support for countries that fall behind.
Box 1. Summary of UNAIDS’ 90–90–90 strategy: policy goal, targets and associated policy content
The ‘90–90–90’ treatment targets set by UNAIDS
Policy goal To eliminate the AIDS epidemic by 2030.
Policy target • 90% of all PLHIV to know their status, 90% of those with diagnosed HIV infection to receive sustained antiretroviral therapy
(81% of PLHIV), and 90% of those on antiretroviral therapy to achieve viral suppression (i.e. 73% of PLHIV) by 2020.
• Each target rises to 95% by 2030 to achieve the end of the AIDS epidemic.
Policy content • First 90:More frequent testing/increase demand for testing; strategic, focused testing to key population groups and/or geogra-
phies; increase/make available a broader number of HIV testing and counselling approaches, e.g. self-testing, provider initiated
counselling and testing and community-based approaches.
• Second 90: Recommend antiretroviral therapy to all people with diagnosed HIV infection (or ‘test and treat’), without the
requirement of a prior CD4 test; use of preferred, optimized regimens; make HIV treatment and care (including diagnostic tests
and other treatment-related items) free to the individual; address implementation issues that have often slowed scale-up, e.g.
frequent drug stockouts, barriers to procurement of optimally affordable medicines and diagnostics, and inadequate availabil-
ity of second- and third-line regimens.
• Third 90: Sustained use of HIV treatment and ongoing virologic monitoring to verify treatment success and to intervene to sup-
port treatment adherence and re-engage those who fall out of care; every person starting HIV treatment will need to have access
to viral load testing.
18 Health Policy and Planning, 2018, Vol. 33, No. 1
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not capture the full range of budget and health system constraints
that may limit the feasibility of approaches deemed cost-effective
from such analyses (Mikkelsen et al. 2017). Constraints include
resource (human and financial) and health system capacity, ease
with which such resources can be reallocated and not based on his-
torical patterns, costs of implementing change and demand for serv-
ices (Hauck et al. 2016; Mikkelsen et al. 2017). Complex public
health interventions, such as those advocated for in 90–90–90,
present a wide range of context specific constraints that may pro-
hibit ease of adoption that must be considered by decision-makers
alongside the benefits of responding to such targets.
In sub-Saharan Africa, where the burden of HIV is greatest,
many health facilities are overburdened and under-resourced and
initiating such high proportions of the population of PLHIV into
care has the potential to exacerbate pre-existing weaknesses in care
provision, such as stock-outs of essential commodities and human
resource challenges (Roberts et al. 2016; Rosen and Fox 2011). For
the targets to be met, a substantial shift is needed from the strategy
of broad nationwide programme scale up, to more targeted and
active promotion and provision of testing, treatment and care that is
cognizant of the geographic and demographic heterogeneity of the
epidemic. An estimated 36 billion USD is required globally per year
between 2015 and 2020 to fund implementation; however, in 2013
an estimated 19 million USD was mobilized for the HIV response,
which falls far short of this new requirement (UNAIDS 2014). Thus,
efforts to prioritize programmes and seek efficiencies will also need
to be supplemented by domestic resource mobilization given that
donor financing for the HIV response has been stabilizing or declin-
ing in recent years (Vassall et al. 2013; Remme et al. 2016).
National level decision-makers are faced with a complex decision
problem regarding how best to target limited resources in order to
achieve expanded coverage of treatment and care services.
Debates on the value of global targets or vertical programmes in
low-income countries and their impact on health systems have pre-
vailed for many years. Arguments against include concerns that tar-
gets can obfuscate efforts to achieve universal health care coverage
by channelling resources toward one health concern that may not
have the greatest effect on population health or be aligned with pri-
orities of the government (De Maeseneer et al. 2008; Dieleman and
Haakenstad 2015). In low-income settings where resources are
highly limited, the potential opportunity cost of reallocation of
health resources to meet just one disease specific target may be great.
An alternative view, however, is that some targets are adopted in
rhetoric only, as a vision to guide the response, but to a large extent
do not influence programme activities or resource allocation and
thus have minimal impact on health. Here targets are of little con-
cern, but are ultimately ineffective at achieving policy change.
Evaluation of the Expanded Programme on Immunization for the
eradication of polio found that, while successful in galvanizing
attention, action and strengthening immunization programmes
more broadly, in some settings there was diversion of resources to
meet this health goal at the expense of other health issues or the
wider development agenda (Sutter and Cochi 1997; Taylor et al.
1997; Loevinsohn et al. 2002). Such findings raise concerns against
global target setting, thus we consider it of value to examine the
process by which targets are adopted and whether they influence
programme planning and resource allocation.
In this research, we aim to explore what the influence of
UNAIDS’ 90–90–90 targets have been on the national HIV pro-
gramme in Ghana and Uganda. We assess how these technical and
ambitious targets have been transferred, or adopted and adapted, to
the national level and whether the transfer of the targets appears in
rhetoric only, or if notable policy, programme and budgetary
changes have occurred to support implementation (we do not assess
implementation). We utilize an integrated analytical approach that
combines the policy transfer framework developed by Dolowitz and
Marsh to consider what has been transferred how this is evidenced,
and constraints on transfer, and supplement this with Global Health
Advocacy and Policy Project (GHAPP) conceptual framework for
the effectiveness of global health networks to provide deeper reflec-
tion on the role of actor networks in mediating the observed
response to the 90–90–90 targets (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996;
Shiffman et al. 2015). We draw on multiple sources of information,
documents of donors and national policy-makers and key informant
interviews, to triangulate findings and minimise bias.
Methods
Setting
Case studies of the response to 90–90–90 were conducted between
August 2016 (25months following UNAIDS’ release of 90–90–90)
and April 2017 in Ghana and Uganda. The countries were selected
Table 1. HIV programme and funding indicators in Ghana and Uganda (UNAIDS 2016; UNAIDS 2016; Institute of Health Metrics and
Evaluation 2016; Granich et al. 2016; The World Bank 2016).
Ghana Uganda
HIV epidemic indicators
Estimated HIV prevalence, 15–49, Spectrum (year of estimate) 1.6% (1.3–1.9%) (2015) 7.1% (6.6–7.7%) (2015)
Estimated number of people living with HIV, Spectrum
(year of estimate)
270 000 (230 000–330 000) (2015) 1 400 000 (1 300 000–1 500 000) (2015)
90–90–90 programme indicators
Estimated percentage of PLHIV aware of their status (year of estimate) 40%a (2014) 69% (2015)
Estimated percentage of diagnosed on treatment (year of estimate) 30% of PLHIVa (2014) 81% (60% of PLHIV) (2015)
Estimated percentage on treatment that are virally suppressed
(year of estimate)
Unknown nationallya (2014) Unknown nationallyb (2015)
Funding indicators
Total HIV spending in US$ (year) 81 677 333 (2011) 579 700 000 (2013)
HIV spending as % GDP (year) 0.21 (2011) 3.91 (2009)
Primary funders of the HIV programme The Global Fund PEPFAR (>70% of HIV/AIDS
programme)
aLimitations in reporting systems result in uncertainty in ascertaining real numbers tested, in care, and retained. Estimates from modelling are uncertain.
bOne study showed 90% viral suppression, but sample was only 42% of estimated population on ART.
Health Policy and Planning, 2018, Vol. 33, No. 1 19
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purposively for their differences in current HIV burden, historic
response to the epidemic, and economic status (Table 1). Uganda has
high HIV burden and a long history of engaging different actors to
implement a variety of approaches to combat the epidemic; how the
low-income nation responds to these ambitious targets in this context
is thus of interest (Allen and Heald 2004; Parkhurst et al. 2002).
Ghana has a low HIV prevalence relative to Uganda but also exhibits
lower treatment coverage. Whilst Ghana has experienced economic
growth to reach lower-middle income status this necessitates greater
counterpart financing for the HIV programme; whether the country
prioritises resources to respond to these targets is thus of interest
(Ghana AIDS Commission 2015). Selection was also somewhat oppor-
tunistic given pre-existing relationships with senior policy-makers that
would enable access to the relevant informants for the study.
Document analysis
Documents relevant to the national HIV response in Ghana and
Uganda were searched for by the primary researcher from websites
of the National AIDS Commission (NAC), Ministry of Health
(MOH), President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), The
Global Fund and Country Coordinating Mechanism (the two major
funders of the HIV programme in both countries) from July 2014
onwards (the date UNAIDS released 90–90–90—at the International
AIDS Society conference in Melbourne). Key informants were also
asked to share documents released post July 2014 that may have
included national HIV policies, programme or budget information.
Twenty-three documents were obtained (14 Ghana, 9 for Uganda).
The document review allowed for tracing of transfer over time.
Documents were assessed for presence or absence of alignment to the
90–90–90 targets in rhetoric (defined as statements regarding the
adoption or alignment to the targets or whether the country is ‘on
track’ to meet the targets), actual or planned policy or programme
changes, and actual or planned budgetary changes (such as seeking
programme efficiencies, donor or domestic resource mobilization or
re-allocation). Details on policy and programme changes were
extracted and compared against recommendations from UNAIDS’
90–90–90 strategy to assess whether a shift in approach from ‘business
as usual’ had occurred. A second reviewer verified data extraction.
Key informant interviews and analysis
In each country, semi-structured interviews were conducted with
purposively sampled individuals in the MOH, NACs, AIDS Control
Program, organizations providing programme funding or technical
assistance [Department for International Development; The Global
Fund; World Health Organization (WHO); UNAIDS; United
Nations’ Children’s Fund (UNICEF); US Government entities such
as PEPFAR, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)], and
major programme implementers. Informants were selected first by
sensitizing each key organization and asking senior staff to nominate
individuals for interview based on their role in the response to 90–
90–90 and knowledge of programme, policy or budget changes.
Informants were asked for names of other key individuals from the
same or other organizations crucial in the response until representa-
tives from all major organizations cited by respondents as important
in the response were covered from both countries; thus resulting in a
slightly different profile of those interviewed based on the composi-
tion of each network responding to 90–90–90 in each country.
Interviews were conducted in-person and individually, except for
three interviews in Ghana (two conducted by telephone and one
with three informants). Thirty-seven interviews were conducted
with key informants, lasting on average 60min (ranging from 40 to
105min) (Table 2). All interviews were conducted in English.
Interviews were also held with informants in malaria and TB pro-
grammes to enable comparison of the response to other diseases and
assess perceptions of financing for HIV from individuals working
outside HIV. Interviews were audio recorded where consent was
given (two respondents, one from Ghana and one from Uganda,
asked to not be audio recorded) and transcribed. Transcripts were
managed and analysed thematically in Dedoose. Coding was ini-
tially deductive applying the pre-existing policy frameworks of
Dolowitz and Marsh and GHAPP, with additional inductive coding
cycles. Qualitative interview data was triangulated with the docu-
ment review. Results are presented where informants contradicted
findings from the document review. Emerging themes and summary
findings from each country were reviewed by local study teams and
discussed. Findings were shared with key informants in both coun-
tries to assess if findings were a fair reflection of the response in their
country; enabling further validation of the findings.
Theoretical framework
Policy transfer theory explores how ‘knowledge about policies,
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political
setting (past or present) are used in the development of policies,
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another politi-
cal setting’ (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). National responses to
global health issues appear increasingly guided by ideas put forward
by organizations in the international community; in particular, in
low- and middle-income settings where financial and technical assis-
tance are often provided in support of adoption of policies or accept-
ance of norms. We utilize elements of two pre-existing theoretical
frameworks to uncover the policy transfer process that has occurred
in Ghana and Uganda. Dolowitz and Marsh’s (1996) framework
poses six questions to examine the policy transfer process (Box 2).
The framework encourages evaluation of the extent to which trans-
fer has occurred and is evident, in addition to what potential con-
straints on transfer exists that may prohibit transfer, both of which
are of value to our investigation into the manner in which the 90–
90–90 targets have been adopted in the current environment of
financial uncertainty and health system capacity constraints (Box 2)
(Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). We integrate this framework with the
GHAPP framework to consider the involvement of actor networks
at local and global levels influencing the response, as opposed to ver-
tical or horizontal analyses commonly applied in policy transfer
studies. Furthermore, while Dolowitz and Marsh consider the
rationale for transfer on a spectrum—from voluntary to more
directly coerced—the network features, policy environment and
issue characteristics considered in the GHAPP framework are used
Table 2. Interviews conducted in Ghana and Uganda
Profession Ghana Uganda
Ministry of Health or National Health Service 1 2
Ghana/Uganda AIDS Commission 3 4
Programme implementers 3 4
Global actors providing technical assistance
and/or funding
7 3
External consultants 2 1
Other (academics, civil society organizations) 0 3
Individuals involved in the response to
malaria or TB
1 3
Total 17 20
20 Health Policy and Planning, 2018, Vol. 33, No. 1
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to consider why such a pattern of transfer was observed. This allows
a more nuanced comparison between the two case study countries.
Thus, questions D to F of Dolowitz and Marsh are expanded upon
utilizing aspects of the GHAPP framework (Box 2).
Ethical approval
Ethical approval was obtained from the authors institutes in the UK,
Ghana and Uganda.
Results
In presenting our results we first respond to questions A–C of the
Dolowitz and Marsh framework where we assimilate findings from
key informants and the document review. Considerations about
how the transfer was mediated, to help explain similarities and dif-
ferences, in both settings are later discussed utilizing the GHAPP
framework in reference to questions D–F of the Dolowitz and
Marsh framework. Findings are summarized in Table 3.
(A) What has been transferred and how is transfer
demonstrated?
All respondents across both settings stated the national HIV
response in their country had adopted the 90–90–90 targets with the
majority stating the targets had influenced significant policy, pro-
gramme and budgetary changes. This was largely supported by find-
ings from the document review; Table 4 presents an overview of the
national documents reviewed. Documents from both settings evi-
dence adoption of the 90–90–90 targets in rhetoric, in addition to
policy, programme and budget changes intended to support imple-
mentation to meet the targets. In both countries, adoption of the
90–90–90 targets, and planned programme and budgetary support
for 90–90–90 is first witnessed in PEPFAR’s Country Operational
Plans and is recognized in national strategic (August 2016 in
Uganda and September 2016 in Ghana), policy and operational
documents subsequently. Ten (71%) documents in Ghana and 4
(44%) documents in Uganda detail proposed, planned or actual pro-
gramme or policy changes to respond to 90–90–90. Of interest,
many key informants in Uganda commented on the alignment of the
latest National Strategic Plan (NSP) to 90–90–90; however, the tar-
gets were only mentioned once on page 64 (compared with 55 men-
tions in the Ghanaian NSP). Two respondents said this was because
the targets came late in the development of the NSP, whereas more
respondents (n¼6) said 90–90–90 came at the perfect time for
inclusion in the strategy. Although not attributed to 90–90–90, the
programme targets in the Ugandan NSP are closely aligned to the
global targets—the target treatment coverage for PLHIV is 80% by
2020 (also stated as 80% in the 2015 PEPFAR Country Operational
Plan, but referred to as ‘national saturation’) as opposed to the 81%
of the 90–90–90 targets.
Details on how the countries intend to respond to 90–90–90 as
demonstrated in the documents reviewed and discussed in interviews
are presented in Table 5 against recommendations from UNAIDS.
Both countries demonstrate a move from broad nationwide scale-up
to an approach that targets populations and geographies of highest
burden to achieve optimal impact with the available resources,
which demonstrates a substantial shift in approach for both coun-
tries. Arguably, Uganda demonstrates a more marked shift, rapidly
moving to district programming, whereas Ghana first adopts a
regional plan and focuses on prior gaps in nationwide intervention
coverage, such as prevention of mother to child transmission. The
following excerpt from PEPFAR Uganda’s Country Operational
Plan summarizes the change toward programme prioritization by
geography and population:
PEPFAR Uganda previously focused on national programmatic
scale up with little emphasis on geographical prevalence, disease
burden, or evidence of KPs [key populations]/PPs [priority
populations]. During 2015 COP [Country Operational Plan]
preparation, attention was paid to aligning district budgets and
associated targets to disease burden and population (PEPFAR
Uganda Country Operational Plan 2015).
Relatively few documents reviewed revealed financial information
relating specifically to the response to 90–90–90. In most cases costs
cited were associated with the policy change for treating all PLHIV
irrespective of CD4 cell count as per the WHO 2015 ART guide-
lines—a policy change considered critical to the attainment of 90–
90–90 (herein referred to as ‘test and treat’). Thus perceptions on
how the targets had influenced the HIV programme budget were
obtained from informants.
The majority of participants felt the targets were largely influen-
tial over allocations within donor budgets, but less so for the
national HIV programme budget. One respondent in Uganda stated:
‘You go and talk to Ministry of Finance and say with respect to 90–
90–90, we have these strategies, how has this changed your budgets?
The answer is zero’. (R1, Uganda). When asked why, respondents
stated that reallocation would not occur as domestic budgets pre-
dominantly relate to recurrent management costs. Across both
Box 2. Details of the theoretical frameworks applied
Theoretical frameworks drawn upon to measure the extent of transfer and consider factors contributing to observations in country case studies
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) framework Global health advocacy and policy project framework
Comprised of six questions (A–F) to help examine all aspects
of the policy transfer process
Three categories comprised of 10 factors that variously could influence
effectiveness of global health networks in attracting attention, resour-
ces, and influencing policy outcomes.
Applied to enable examination of policy transfer process in
both settings and thus compare differences between settings
Applied to gain insight into which factors facilitate transfer and explain
observed differences between settings
A. What is transferred and how is transfer demonstrated?
B. What are the degrees of transfer?
C. What restricts or facilitates transfer?
D. From where are lessons drawn?
E. Who are key actors involved in the transfer process?
F. Why do actors engage in transfer?
1. Network and actor features: factors internal to the network (1) leader-
ship, (2) governance, (3) composition, (4) framing strategies utilized
2. Policy environment: factors external to the network (5) allies and
opponents, (6) funding availability, (7) norms.
3. Issue characteristics: features of the problem the network seeks to
address (8) severity, (9) tractability, (10) affected groups.
Health Policy and Planning, 2018, Vol. 33, No. 1 21
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Table 3. Summary of policy transfer in both settings utilizing Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) policy transfer framework
(A) What is trans-
ferred & what is the
evidence of transfer?
(B) To what degree
has the policy been
transferred?
(C) What are the con-
straints on transfer?
(D) From where are
lessons drawn?
(E) Who are key
actors involved in the
transfer process?
(F) Why do actors
engage in transfer?
Summary
findings
(presented
as common
to both set-
tings or spe-
cific to
either
country)
Both:
• The 90–90–90
treatment targets
(also the policy
goal of eliminating
the AIDS epi-
demic, and much
of the associated
policy content)
and concepts for
more targeted pro-
gramming that is
cognizant of geog-
raphy and popula-
tion groups. In
addition the need
to increase pro-
gramme efficiency
and mobilize
resources domesti-
cally. This was
evidenced in rhet-
oric with all key
informants in both
settings and in
policy, pro-
gramme and budg-
etary documents
(but to a lesser
extent for the
latter).
Ghana:
• Latest NSP ori-
ented entirely
around 90–90–90
targets, meeting
the targets is a
core aim, is men-
tioned upfront in
chairman’s letter
indicating high
level commitment,
and has separate
sections are
devoted to each
90 target stating
which interven-
tions will be
implemented to
meet that target.
However, indica-
tion from inform-
ants that less is
ready for imple-
mentation other
than roll out of
test and treat as
supported by
PEPFAR and The
Global Fund.
Both:
• Whilst many
documents dem-
onstrate a direct
copy of the target,
upon further
investigation
across operational
and implementa-
tion documents, a
more modest set
of targets appear
to have been
adopted or are to
be aimed for.
Ghana:
• The focus is pre-
dominantly on the
first two 90s as
access to viral
load machines is
limited. For the
third 90 there is
an emphasis more
on health systems
strengthening and
adherence
initiatives.
Uganda:
• National strategic
plan and PEPFAR
Country
Operational Plans
contain targets for
second 90 of 80%
opposed to 81%.
It is not clear why
this slightly lower
target has been
adopted—one
informant said it
was as a conse-
quence of a mod-
elling analysis of
what programme
coverage levels
could realistically
be achieved with
anticipated avail-
able resources.
Both:
• Inadequate financial
resources available
for commodities for
the response: HIV
test kits, antiretrovi-
ral treatment for
treating all PLHIV,
and viral load
testing.
• Health system
capacity constraints,
such as human
resources to support
higher patient loads.
• Complex policy tar-
gets that may
require application
of mathematical
modelling to guide
programme deci-
sions, but capacity
at the local level for
such approaches is
relatively limited.
• Large-scale pro-
grammatic shift
required from
approach of broad
nationwide scale up
to targeted
approach, including
shift in the manner
in which resources
are allocated for the
response.
Ghana:
• Uncertainty in epi-
demiological infor-
mation at lower
administrative levels
results in difficulty
in prioritizing
resources lower
than the regional
level. Resources are
being allocated to
improve data qual-
ity and for monitor-
ing of progress
toward 90–90–90.
• Previously lack of
political support for
targeted approaches
as did not want to
appear not equitable
in service provision.
Uganda:
• Appears to be
greater flexibility in
Both:
• From interna-
tional organiza-
tions and
implementing
agencies. Notably
directly from
UNAIDS’ 90–90–
90 strategy docu-
ment, derived
from mathemati-
cal modelling
study.
• Decision-makers
in both countries
reported using in-
country experi-
ence about effec-
tive interventions.
• Lessons learned
from new model-
ling studies in
both countries in
addition to the
application of epi-
demiological
information to
consider which
geographies and
populations to pri-
oritize in the
response.
Both:
• Well-coordinated
health network
present in both
settings, clearly
defined roles, com-
prised of actors at
local and global
levels:
• National/local:
NAC, MOH,
major local
implementers
• Global: WHO,
UNAIDS, and US
Government enti-
ties (CDC,
PEPFAR, USAID),
The Global Fund
(but to a lesser
extent in both
countries in the
first two years after
90–90–90 was
released as both
countries were in
the middle of an
existing funding
period)
Ghana:
• Private companies
(in particular, oil
industry) through
corporate social
responsibility
agreements,
resource mobiliza-
tion officer
(UNDP funded)
• EQUIP providing
technical assis-
tance in imple-
mentation for
responding to 90–
90–90
• Health Policy Plus
providing model-
ling for scenarios
for the National
Strategic Plan
Uganda:
• Civil society
organizations, e.g.
NAFOPHANU
(hosted the 90–
90–90 country
launch)
• Futures Institute—
modelled and
costed scenarios
Both:
• Whilst the reasons
for adoption of
the targets are
many there are
substantial con-
straints operating
the may limit the
rationality of
implementing
these targets, in
particular when
considering the
cost required in
terms of overall
benefit to popula-
tion health as a
decision maker.
There is a clear
amount of interna-
tional pressure to
respond to the tar-
gets – in many
cases countries
may have signed
on to respond to
the targets before
even conducting
studies into the
feasibility of
implementation.
Respondents in
both settings cited
the feeling of
international pres-
sure to adopt the
targets regardless
of available
funding.
• Summary:
Transfer of 90–
90–90 is voluntary
as was not a pre-
requisite for
receipt of funding,
driven by per-
ceived necessity as
a mandate to the
UN and for inter-
national accept-
ance/conforming
to global norms to
respond.
However, to
receive funding
from PEPFAR for
‘test and treat’
both countries
needed to revise
their treatment
guidelines—for
(continued)
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settings, no respondents were aware of funds being transferred to
HIV from other areas of the health budget to respond to these tar-
gets or any other previously. Respondents from TB and malaria pro-
grammes stated that they were not aware of, or did not feel that,
their disease budget had suffered as a consequence of 90–90–90. A
number of respondents in Ghana were optimistic that the
Government of Ghana would pledge additional funds as they previ-
ously pledged 150 million Ghana Cedis (USD 98.5m 2011 equiva-
lent) for implementation of the 2011–16 NSP at a United Nations
Special Session. Other respondents were more sceptical, stating
actual government disbursement was 50% of what was promised:
‘Financially we have not seen the government honour its funding
commitments to HIV—at least on the commodity side of HIV in the
past 2 or 3 years’ (R10, Ghana). One respondent in Ghana thought
there could be reallocation of central funds if Government of Ghana
could not mobilize sufficient resources elsewhere to honour commit-
ments of counterpart financing for ‘test and treat’ to PEPFAR for
the 2019/20 period.
Given unlikely gains from government resources in both settings,
the NACs were undertaking a variety of approaches for domestic
resource mobilization to close the resource gap. The Ghana NAC
were awarded a grant from the United Nations Development
Program for the employment of a full-time ‘Resource Mobilization
Officer’ and were continuing efforts to institutionalize HIV funding
as part of private companies’ corporate social responsibility, holding
annual private sector roundtable breakfast meetings to seek funds.
In Uganda a national tax (2% from alcoholic drinks) was to be
developed: ‘AIDS Trust Fund’. However, progress in establishing
the fund was uncertain due to disagreements between MOH and
Uganda NAC about whether this should be managed by MOH or
independently. Ghana NAC passed legislation in 2015 for the devel-
opment of a similar HIV fund in Ghana. The volume of funding
obtained from these means, however, is limited and will not be suffi-
cient to close the resource gap in either country.
Respondents in both countries felt that donor funding was very
responsive to the targets set by UNAIDS. A number of respondents
commented on the well-coordinated relationship of these actors at
the global level—UNAIDS setting targets that are aligned with the
WHO treatment guidelines and financed by PEPFAR at the national
level, in particular for the rollout of ‘test and treat’. Respondents in
Uganda commented not just on the volume of additional resources,
but an increase in the rate of disbursement of PEPFAR and Irish Aid
in response to ‘test and treat’. At the time of interviewing, both
countries were mid-way through their current funding period from
The Global Fund, but in Ghana where The Global Fund are the
major funder, discussions had occurred with the Portfolio Manager
regarding reprogramming of funds to accommodate commodities
for 90–90–90 and also to frontload funds if necessary, indicating the
alignment of interests of global health actors in meeting the targets:
Global Fund has even scaled-up funding, you know, so that we
will be able to achieve these targets to the extent that they are
even ready to front-load some of the funds so as that we can
scale-up - especially testing (R2, Ghana).
In Ghana, PEPFAR will frontload 24 million USD for ‘test and treat’
for 2017/18 until Government of Ghana can mobilise their own
resources to fund the 2019/20 period. While PEPFAR have previ-
ously contributed to the response in Ghana this has been in the
realm of 14 million USD for provision of technical assistance only
and not for programme support or commodities.
(B) What was the degree of transfer?
Direct transfer of a target or programmes from one jurisdiction to
another is referred to as ‘copying’ by Dolowitz and Marsh.
Throughout most documents, both countries appear to have directly
adopted the 90–90–90 targets without adaptation; in reality, slightly
lower or adapted targets may have been transferred. For example, in
Ghana, 90–90–90 was originally only intended for key populations
and not the general population (Table 4). Further, whilst there are
statements of adopting 90–90–90 there is clear intention to put pol-
icy, programme and financial support for viral load on a lower pri-
ority, however, until further into the second half of the time period
for 90–90–90 given the expense of viral load machines and current
low levels of access (coverage<10%) to viral load testing (Table 5).
One respondent commented:
even though we have started now we are actually starting slowly,
because of the available commodities (R6, Ghana).
In Uganda, the NSP (2015/16–2019/20) and PEPFAR Country
Operational Plan state target ART coverage levels of 80% of PLHIV
rather than then 81% that is cited in the UNAIDS 90–90–90 targets.
Uganda’s marginally lower target of may be described as a
Table 3. Continued
(A) What is trans-
ferred & what is the
evidence of transfer?
(B) To what degree
has the policy been
transferred?
(C) What are the con-
straints on transfer?
(D) From where are
lessons drawn?
(E) Who are key
actors involved in the
transfer process?
(F) Why do actors
engage in transfer?
Uganda:
• More limited men-
tion of 90–90–90
in national strate-
gic and opera-
tional documents,
but very clear, tar-
geted approach in
PEPFAR Country
Operational Plans.
reallocation of
resources to more
targeted approach
as PEPFAR are the
major funder of the
HIV programme
and thus have more
autonomy with
which to decide how
to reallocate com-
pared with govern-
ment resources.
Therefore, fewer
constraints on trans-
fer in Uganda.
for 90–90–90 for
consideration
• Irish Aid
• To a lesser extent
than in Ghana—
private sector,
groups such as the
Uganda Olympics
Committee
this specific policy
this could there-
fore be argued as
more a direct
imposition.
Ghana:
• 90–90–90 transfer
utilized as an
advocacy tool to
secure additional
funds due to coun-
terpart funding
needs.
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Table 4. Review of documents for the national HIV response in Ghana and Uganda to assess influence of UNAIDS’ 90–90–90 targets
No. Document title (author) Date document
published
Document
type
Number of
mentions/
number
of pages
Rhetoric Policy or programme changes Budgetary changes
Ghana
1 The costs and impact of investing in
the HIV response in Ghana
(Health Policy Project, USAID,
PEPFAR)
April 2015 Strategic 8/42 – X X
Pre-adoption of 90–90–90 by
Ghana—modelling to consider
feasibility of adopting targetsa
Proposed/scenario analysis for 90–
90–90
Modelled estimates of resource needs
for 90–90–90
• Total cost of 450 million for NSP
scenario including attainment of
90–90–90
2 Ghana Country Operational Plan
2015 (PEPFAR)
August 2015 Operational 22/74 X X X
Adopted 90–90–90 for key
populations
• The PEPFAR Ghana targets are
to achieve 90–90–90 among 60%
of key populations in in high bur-
den regions/districts in southern
Ghana by the end of 2017.
• Not on track to meet 90–90–90
for whole population, only suffi-
cient ART for 50% of PLHIV
Core plans for 90–90–90 for key
populations onlyPredominantly
first 90 (HIV counselling and test-
ing for key populations in 5 scale
up regions and in Cape Coast) but
support for lab services for testing
and viral load monitoring and
retention with ‘Models of Hope’
programme
For key populations only
• Resources allocated for pro-
gramme activities (for example,
lab, HIV counselling and testing)
3 Making strategic choices: Prioritizing
HIV interventions in a resource
limited setting. Options for
Ghana’s next National Strategic
Plan (USAID, PEPFAR, Health
Policy Plus)
September
2015
Strategic 19/59 – X X
Pre-adoption of 90–90–90 by
Ghana—modelling to consider
feasibility finds: ‘Even if such sig-
nificant resource mobilization was
successful, unless the country
addresses the health systems and
policy gaps identified in this study,
it will not achieve its ultimate goal
of getting 90 percent of PLHIVs to
know their status, 90 percent of
them to be on treatment, and 90
percent of those on treatment to
be virally suppressed’a
Proposed/scenario analysis for 90–
90–90
• Need to focus on indirect (reduc-
ing stigma, health systems
strengthening) as well as direct
interventions otherwise will not
achieve 90–90–90
Modelled estimates of resource needs
for 90–90–90
• 80 million USD for treatment
alone pa and 2015 NSP budget
for treatment was US$19 mil-
lion—therefore massive resource
scale up required
4 Ghana Country Operational Plan
2016 (PEPFAR)
June 2016 Operational 22/70 X X X
Does not specifically say that Ghana
has adopted the targets
Plans for achieving first and second
90, with systems strengthening to
assist in preparation for meeting
third 90
Allocations for some activities relat-
ing to 90–90–90 but not all
(continued)
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Table 4. Continued
No. Document title (author) Date document
published
Document
type
Number of
mentions/
number
of pages
Rhetoric Policy or programme changes Budgetary changes
5 90–90–90 Roadmap to Treat All
(National AIDS Control Program)
July 2016 Operational,
presentation
4 X X –
Adopted 90–90–90 and Fast Track
strategy
Plans for second 90
6 Locate, test, treat, and retain (L2TR)
90–90–90 Ghana Campaign
(National AIDS Control Program)
July 2016 Operational 61/20 X X –
Adopted 90–90–90 and Fast Track
strategy
Plans for 90–90–90, in particular the
‘one million community health
workers project’
7 Guidelines for antiretroviral therapy
in Ghana (Ministry of Health,
NACP, Ghana Health Service)
September 2016 Policy/guideline 2/134 X – –
Adopted 90–90–90
8 National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan
2016–20 (Ghana AIDS
Commission)
September 2016 Strategic 55/131 X X X
Adopted 90–90–90 and Fast Track
strategy
Plans for achieving first and second
90, with systems strengthening to
assist in preparation for meeting
third 90
9 Ghana AIDS Commission launches
the national HIV and AIDS strate-
gic plan & ‘treat all’ policy
(Ghana AIDS Commission)
2016 Press release 1/2 X – –
Informed by 90–90–90 and inline
with SDGs
10 Treat All Implementation Update
(NACP)
October 2016 Operational—
presentation
2/29 – X X
Actual activities for second 90 Need for reprogramming/realloca-
tion of funds for 90–90–90
11 Guidance on the CCM Approach to
develop the funding request 2018–
20 (The Global Fund)
October 2016 Funding request 1/12 – – X
NACP to consider modelling from
USAID/Health Policy Plus for
resource needs for 90–90–90
12 HIV/TB Funding Request 2018–20
(Ghana CCM)
December 2016 Funding request 10/33 X X X
Adopted 90–90–90 Plans for first 90 and actual for sec-
ond 90
• Want to focus on PMTCT and
early infant diagnosis as main
way to increase diagnosis and
coverage of ART
Planned and actual re-allocation/re-
programming of TGF budget allo-
cation, efforts to seek efficiency
gains and prioritize programme
activities to geography and popu-
lations in need, donor and domes-
tic resource mobilization• Plans for three 90s for key
populations
13 Prioritized above allocation request
(Ghana CCM)
December 2016 Funding request 2/5 – X X
To support planned and already
ongoing activities
Funding request for Models of Hope
and viral load monitoring
(continued)
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Table 4. Continued
No. Document title (author) Date document
published
Document
type
Number of
mentions/
number
of pages
Rhetoric Policy or programme changes Budgetary changes
14 Ghana Global Fund 2017–19
Allocation Letter (The Global
Fund)
December 2016 Funding letter 0/12 – – –
Does state need to strengthen the cas-
cade to meet the Fast Track targets
but no mention of 90–90–90
specificallya
Uganda
1 Uganda Country Operational Plan
2015 (PEPFAR)
September 2015 Operational 7/104 X X X
Adopted and on track ‘15 districts
have already met the first two 90s’
Plans to focus on first two 90s for
scale up districts and plans for
nationwide scale up of VL
‘PEPFAR Uganda is able to make
these shifts through an additional
$30 million for treatment scale-
up, further streamlining of the
Country Operational Plan 12 core
package of services, transitioning
out of low burden/low yield dis-
tricts and sites, rationalization of
implementing partners, and explo-
ration of more efficient service
delivery models’.
2 National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan
2015/16–19/20 (Uganda AIDS
Commission)
August 2016 Strategic 1/87 X – –
Strategy is ‘cognizant of the global
and national commitment to end
AIDS by 2030’ and aligned to the
Fast Track Strategy and 90–90–90
Programme activities are not directly
attributed to attainment of 90–90–
90 goals in the NSPa
Estimated cost of implementing NSP
goals is 3647.9 billion USD for 5-
year perioda
3 National HIV/AIDS Monitoring and
Evaluation Plan 2015/16–19/20
(Uganda AIDS Commission)
August 2016 Operational 0/113 – – –
Aligned to ‘end of AIDS by 2030’
but no mention of 90–90–90
specificallya
4 National HIV/AIDS Indicator
Handbook 2015/16–19/20
(Uganda AIDS Commission)
August 2016 Operational 0/97 – – –
5 National HIV/AIDS Priority Action
Plan (Uganda AIDS Commission)
August 2016 Strategic 0/72 – – –
6 2015/16 Country Progress Report
(Uganda AIDS Commission)
November 2016 Evaluation 25/82 X X –
Adopted and on track Actual changes for first year and
planned up until 2020
7 Consolidated HIV Prevention and
Treatment Guidelines (Ministry of
Health Uganda)
December 2016 Guideline 7/152 X X –
Adopted 90–90–90 Actual policy change for all three
90s—treat all irrespective of CD4
cell count, differentiated service
delivery, improved retention
strategies
(continued)
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Table 4. Continued
No. Document title (author) Date document
published
Document
type
Number of
mentions/
number
of pages
Rhetoric Policy or programme changes Budgetary changes
8 Uganda Country Operational Plan
2016 (PEPFAR)
January 2017 Operational 32/65 X X X
Adopted, and on track pending
implementation of test and treat
and new service delivery models to
reduce issues with commodities
for rapid scale up
Plans and actual ongoing activities
for 90–90–90
Plans for efficiency gains through
new service delivery models and
prioritization of testing, treatment
and care services by geography
and location
9 National Multi-Sectorial HIV/AIDS
Resource Mobilization Strategy
2015/16–19/20 (Uganda AIDS
Commission)
April 2017 Strategic 3/89 X – X
States national response is aligned to
90–90–90
Implementation of the strategy aims
to raise 69 million USD toward
the 3647 million USD needed for
the NSP.90–90–90 is cited as a
reason for increasing mobilization
efforts, but the amount from these
efforts targeted to meeting 90–90–
90 is unclear.
aInformation detailed is considered relevant although does not necessarily provide evidence of the transfer of 90–90–90.
Key:
Number of mentions:
One count given to a mention of ‘90–90–90’ and each of the sub goals, for example, 0first 900 or the equivalent percentage for each category, i.e. 90%, 81% or 73%. Count only once per sentence, or a figure, and only once in
table unless 90–90–90 is the content of cells in a table, in which case count each mention.
Standardized data extraction form used for reviewing each document:
1. Rhetoric: Statement of the nation’s adoption, commitment or alignment to the 90–90–90 treatment targets or Fast Track strategy, including statements about the country being 0on track0 to any or all three of the targets.
Including problem statements and magnitude of the problem.
2. Policy or programme change: Statements about 90–90–90 are supported by recommended, planned or implemented policy or program change intended to achieve 90–90–90 or each of its sub-goals.
3. Budgetary changes: Statements about 90–90–90 that are supported by recommended, planned or actual reallocation of resources, resource mobilization, and efforts to seek efficiencies (includes modelled estimates of
resource needs and resource allocation).
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Table 5. Alignment of national HIV programme activities with recommendations by UNAIDS in 90–90–90 strategy document
UNAIDS 90–90–90 Strategy: policy
content for each target
National-level adoption of 90–90–90: policy and programme activities planned and actual
Ghana Uganda
First 90: 90% of PLHIV to know their status
More frequent testing/increase demand
for testing.
• Nationwide ‘Know Your HIV Status’ cam-
paign with special focus on high yield geo-
graphic locations and population groups.
• HIV-related stigma and discrimination
reduction campaign.
• Provide HIV testing services at multiple serv-
ice delivery points—health facilities includ-
ing clinics, community and outreach services
delivery points, special events etc.
• Expand cadre of service providers for out-
reach testing services.
• Nationwide testing campaigns. Numerous
campaigns for adolescents: peer-to-peer
engagement, social media campaigns.
Strategic, focused testing to key popula-
tion groups and/or geographies.
• Increase testing in four regions with antena-
tal clinic prevalence >2%.
• Improve targeted testing of key populations
starting with the four priority regions
(Ashanti, Eastern, Greater Accra and
Western) and Brong Ahafo (facility-based
and outreach).
• Pregnant women and TB patients
• Outreach testing in the general population
will not be done because of low yield but
will continue for key populations.
• Discontinue low-yield HIV testing service
activities and concentrate on high-yield
activities.
• 27 PEPFAR focus testing districts with regu-
lar monitoring to assess yield. High yield
areas, e.g. fishing communities where HIV
prevalence ranges between 14.9% and 35%
around the shores of Lake Victoria, other
lake systems throughout the country, and on
the border with the Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
• Deliver HIV testing services in male domi-
nated work settings and areas where male
access to services is poor.
• Test and start will minimize number of
repeat tests required.
Make available a broader number of
HIV testing and counselling
approaches, e.g. self-testing, provider
initiated counselling and testing and
community-based approaches.
• Reactivate provider-initiated testing services
(PITC) to include testing of children on
admission, emergency room testing,
increased testing in DOTS corners, blood
donor testing and diagnostic testing to
include all Hepatitis B and C positive clients.
• Not doing nationwide PITCa
• To improve access and efficiency of HIV
testing services a mix of health facility and
community-based approaches to be utilized.
• Differentiated models of HIV testing services
have been developed:
• Facility based approaches: routine PITC
that is ‘opt out’ and client initiated test-
ing and counselling.
• Community based approaches: Index
client testing—HBCT or snowball, out-
reach HIV testing services in hotspots
and workplaces.
• Pilot studies for HIV self-test are
underway and pending attainment of
supporting evidence, guidelines on roll
out will be developed by MOH.
• Increase partner notification strategies.
Second 90: 90% of those diagnosed to be on treatment
Recommend antiretroviral therapy to all
people with diagnosed HIV infection,
without the requirement of a prior
CD4 test.
• Yes, but in a more staggered way as nation-
wide scale up of test and treat too expensive.
• ‘Test and treat’ rolled out in four regions 1
October 2016:
• Fast track enrolment of clients including
key populations receiving clinical care
• Intensify current enrolment of HIV
positive pregnant women, children, TB
clients, hepatitis B and C clients, key
populations and serodiscordant clients.
• Scale-up ART in TB DOTS sites and
PMTCT sites
• From January 2017 implement ‘test and
treat’ to remaining 6 other regions.
• The Government of Uganda provided com-
mitment to begin ‘test and treat’ in October
2016 pending reforms of the supply chain –
to be conducted by PEPFAR and the MOH.
• ‘Test and treat’ was rolled out January 2017.
(continued)
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‘combined response’, which pertains to a mixture of different poli-
cies relevant to the target as the 80% may instead reflect the adop-
tion of ‘universal access’ targets (World Health Organization 2013).
(C) What are the constraints on transfer?
The most commonly cited constraint on transfer by informants
across both settings is the inadequate financial and human resources
for the response. Limitations on commodities were frequently cited:
HIV test kits, ART for treating all PLHIV and viral load testing.
Both countries identified a large resource gap for the 5-year period
of their NSPs, which is intended to include the response to 90–90–
90: 105.42 million USD in Ghana NSP and 918.40 million USD in
Uganda (Ghana AIDS Commission 2016; Uganda AIDS
Commission 2016). Despite efforts to mobilize, and better utilize
resources for the response, respondents from both settings expressed
concern that the resource gap would not be closed, with one
respondent in Ghana stating:
The truth and the reality is that if we are not careful then we will
be affected by this funding gap. Those who are putting money
forward say the money is coming, but money is not coming and
so can we find a way to slow down. It means that we are not set-
ting ourselves to meet the target (R6, Ghana).
Respondents in Ghana reported a higher number of alternate con-
straints to the transfer of the targets than in Uganda. One respond-
ent commented on constraints observed in reallocating resources
from more generalized programme scale up to selected regions, not-
ing that initially there had been little political support for prioritized
programmes over universal coverage. Further to this, the respondent
noted that limitations in epidemiological information at lower
administrative units added a fair amount of uncertainty in pro-
gramme planning and resource allocation for the response.
Conversely, four respondents felt very confident in the location of
PLHIV for informing programmes at local levels. Respondents with
positions relating to implementation discussed concerns over health
system capacity in regard to the uptake of newly developed task-
Table 5. Continued
UNAIDS 90–90–90 Strategy: policy
content for each target
National-level adoption of 90–90–90: policy and programme activities planned and actual
Ghana Uganda
Use of preferred, optimized regimens. • Preferred first line regimens: tenofo-
virþemtricitabine or tenofo-
virþlamivudineþan NNRTI such as
efavirenz.
• Recommended first line regimen in accord-
ance with WHO recommendations: tenofo-
virþlamivudineþefavirenz. All HIV-infected
adults and adolescents aged 10 years and
above should be initiated on tenofovir þ
lamivudine and efavirenz as a once-daily
fixed dose combination.
Make HIV treatment and care, including
diagnostic tests and other treatment-
related items, free to the individual.
• Not discussed in interviews or identified in
documents reviewed.
• Not discussed in interviews and not identi-
fied in documents, but HIV testing and treat-
ment is thought to be free to the individual
in Uganda.
Address implementation issues that have
often slowed scale-up, e.g. frequent
drug stock outs, barriers to procure-
ment of optimally affordable medi-
cines and diagnostics, and inadequate
availability of second- and third-line
regimens.
• Reviews being undertaken. Consideration
given to how to manage stock outs and high
demand for treatment.
• In the event of deep and prolonged periods
of ART stock outs, priority will be given to
PLHIV with CD4 of less than 500.
• Reviews being undertaken to streamline
pipeline.
• Differentiated service delivery being
implemented.
• Guidelines for reallocation of commodities
between facilities and improvements in com-
munication developed.
Third 90: 90% of those on treatment to achieve viral suppression
Sustained use of HIV treatment and
ongoing virologic monitoring to verify
treatment success and to intervene to
support treatment adherence and re-
engage those who fall out of care.
• Ghana’s focus for the first half of the 90–90–
90 time period is to focus on the first two
90s and then gradually draw focus on scale
up of viral load. More efforts instead on
adherence of patients on ART.
• PEPFAR will support MOH’s transition to
viral load testing for ART monitoring.
Every person starting HIV treatment will
need to have access to viral load
testing.
• Current utilization of viral load machines
considered to be< 10%.
• NACP in collaboration with PEPFAR and
CDC will review laboratory policy and stra-
tegic plan, develop guidelines and scale up
plans for viral load testing and train all labo-
ratory staff on these documents. These
guidelines would support an increase in the
uptake of viral load.
• Implementation of the plan is scheduled to
begin in the third quarter of 2017 supported
by reprogrammed funds from The Global
Fund (if awarded). The plan is to scale this
up in 2018–20.
• A plan was devised to increase the viral load
tests from 100 000 in 2014 to 1.2 million
tests per year in 2018.
aOne informant reported routine PITC was not to be rolled out nationally due to limited resources.
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shifting guidelines (not released at time of publication). Whilst these
factors had not influenced the adoption of the targets, they are likely
to influence the policy-practice gap. One respondent phrased this
succinctly:
So it feels a bit like 90–90–90 has been launched in name and tar-
gets have been put in place and there is a roadmap, very high
level, but there is no detailed planning as yet and it is not clear
yet what the output will be (R17, Ghana).
(D–F) Who was involved in transfer, from where were
lessons drawn, and why did transfer occur?
Findings supplemented by the GHAPP framework
Despite the notable constraints on transfer of 90–90–90 that persist
in both settings, evidence exists of a response to the 90–90–90 tar-
gets, with substantial programmatic shifts, supported by donor
funding and domestic resource mobilization. The primary reason, or
a comprehensive list of all causative factors, influencing transfer of
the targets, cannot be fully known, however, we identify potential
influences utilizing the 10 factors described in the GHAPP frame-
work (Box 2).
The network of actors involved in the transfer of the target was
diverse but broadly similar across Ghana and Uganda (Table 3);
comprised of actors at global and local levels from a variety of sec-
tors within and outside health (Factor 3—composition of actor net-
works). In Uganda, however, PEPFAR has a much more dominant
role, funding over 70% of the HIV programme. There was no major
opposition to the transfer of the targets noted by respondents from
either setting; however, a senior implementer in Ghana voiced they
had wanted adoption of more modest and realistic targets given per-
ceived implementation challenges and resource gaps: ‘I kept men-
tioning it is not possible and we won’t do it until we get the money –
people were feeling that I was going to be a stumbling block’ (R6,
Ghana) (Factor 5—allies and opponents). UNAIDS Geneva, utilizing
its widely accepted role as a technical leader in the HIV response,
created awareness of the targets through several participatory ven-
ues for discussion with policy-makers from sub-Saharan Africa,
including Ghana and Uganda: launch at International AIDS Society
meeting in Melbourne, Australia (2014), United Nations retreat in
Addis Ababa (2015) and formal adoption by the African Union at a
meeting in Johannesburg in 2015 (Factor 1—leadership). Once
passed down to the national level, the local health networks in both
settings, was described as well governed by all respondents (particu-
larly in comparison to the ‘disorganized past’), with all actors partic-
ipating in the network clear on their roles and responsibility in the
response, with NACs coordinating the effort (Factor 2—
governance). In Uganda, there was a clear role of civil society and
affected populations who had bought into the targets and were
advocating for a response (Factor 10—role of affected groups).
Consequently, the national launch for 90–90–90, organized by
UNAIDS and Uganda NAC, was held at the main local organization
for people living with HIV, which was cited by many as playing an
important role in acceptance of the targets locally, in particular by
affected groups. In Ghana, the Director General of the NAC was
named by many as a clear leader in the response, acting as a policy
entrepreneur, as a result of her position on central UNAIDS boards
(Factor 1—leadership), which may explain the vocal response to 90–
90–90 (Table 4) despite the significant financial and health system
constraints demonstrated in the USAID reports: ‘The Director
General is on the panel of the UNAIDS and so she would really
want to demonstrate clearly our commitment [to 90–90–90]’. R1,
Ghana. In Uganda, such a significant portion of the programme is
funded by PEPFAR, who appear to have been able to relatively
quickly refocus their programme activities from general nationwide
scale up to district programming (Factor 6 – funding). In both set-
tings, it appears that lessons were also drawn from mathematical
modelling analyses, typically conducted and funded by US
Government agencies; however, the extent to which these studies
influenced actual programme activities is unclear (Factor 3 – compo-
sition of actor networks). In Uganda, a respondent explained that
utilizing modelling, a number of programme scenarios for the HIV
response were simulated, including one to meet 90–90–90 and
another scenario (‘feasible maximum’) that estimated the pro-
gramme coverage achievable with the resources realistically to be
mobilized in the country. The latter scenario was selected and incor-
porated into the NSP, perhaps explaining the slightly lower targets
adopted.
The health networks in both settings appear to have developed
highly effective framing strategies for encouraging a response to the
90–90–90 targets (Factor 4 – framing strategies). Respondents from
both countries demonstrated recognition of the benefits of meeting
the policy target, both clinically and at the population level.
Specifically, interviewees spoke of the merits of early treatment, the
deployment of effective interventions (Factor 9—tractability), and
the importance of eliminating the AIDS epidemic (the ‘policy goal’).
The lower severity of the epidemic in Ghana could have been pro-
hibitive in ensuring rapid transfer of the 90–90–90 targets (Factor 5
– severity). However, the network of actors appear to have still been
effective in facilitating marked policy and programme change by
utilizing framing strategies (Factor 4) – that the low HIV prevalence
in Ghana should not encourage complacency, but should instead
motivate desire to eradicate HIV so that the country may demon-
strate leadership in West Africa, with one stating: ‘only right to be
able to address this issue and eliminate HIV from this country while
the epidemic is still small’ (R11). Such phrasing of ‘only right’ also
demonstrates the now well-embedded norms of human rights within
the HIV response that encourage a response, such as the right to
health, and thus access to efficacious medicines, which is aligned
with the 90–90–90 treatment targets (Factor 7—norms).
Whilst all respondents voiced that transfer was voluntary or ‘not
an imposition’, transfer of the target was clearly attributed to the
mandate to respond to the United Nations (Table 3). Some respond-
ents described a feeling of pressure or competition within the inter-
national community, put by one Ugandan respondent (Factor 7—
norms): ‘that you just look terrible if you do not pick up the
target’(R9). The majority of informants across both settings said
that availability of funding was not a reason to adopt the 90–90–90
targets given the resources available would be insufficient for the
complete response. However, it did still appear that there was a
strong financial motivation for accepting the targets (Factor 6—
funding). PEPFAR have largely driven the response to ‘test and treat’
in both settings, providing funding for commodities; funding for
commodities was made available further to necessary revisions in
clinical treatment guidelines. One respondent in Uganda succinctly
highlighted the requirement to respond to the United Nations and
for securing funding:
The 90–90–90 targets are global targets and that is guidance that
cascades from UNAIDS and WHO - member countries have to
respond to that, but also that is essentially an addendum to
Sustainable Development Goals and a framework for funding. If
you are not there then you cannot get funding because this is the
framework (R6, Uganda).
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It is possible the environment of declining donor funding contributes
to greater desire for national level decision-makers to adopt targets
in efforts to compete for more funding. The policy goal of eliminat-
ing the AIDS epidemic is used not only as an advocacy message to
secure financing from current donors, but also to seek additional
funding from new donors, private companies and through novel
financing mechanisms created through the MOH, such as the AIDS
Trust Fund. This was particularly exemplified in Ghana where there
are requirements for counterpart financing. A Ghanaian respondent
described how the commitments to 90–90–90 in the NSP was
intended for advocacy for resource mobilization:
You always have to make a strong recommendation with a strate-
gic document such as this [the NSP]. . . We all need to make our
case for resources (R3, Ghana).
All respondents in both countries continue to be in favour of ambi-
tious health targets to help galvanise action and leadership for issues
of public health significance. A small number of respondents in both
countries did view the targets more as ‘just a slogan’ or symbolic.
Many felt recognition for progress should be just as important as
meeting targets and there should be better follow up and evaluation
by UN agencies to help countries that fall behind.
Discussion
The setting of health targets by global health institutions intended
for adoption at the national-level is increasingly commonplace.
Review of the influence of these targets on policy, programme, and
resources is of value to those that set the targets and those that are
intended to respond. First, as global health initiatives can ascertain
whether the targets they set result in any real changes to programmes,
and learn from factors that facilitate and hinder adoption. Second,
as it is not necessarily clear that national level decision-makers
should respond to all targets set down upon them because of
resource constraints on the health budget. In this study, we explore
the transfer of the 90–90–90 treatment targets set by UNAIDS near
to midway through the timeframe to 2020, in two countries, Ghana
and Uganda, that have markedly different HIV disease burden.
Within a relatively short time frame, the policy targets were
incorporated into relevant donor and national strategies, policies
and operational plans in both countries to varying degrees.
Concerns have been raised previously about the slow pace of policy
translation in many sub-Saharan African countries, whereas we
demonstrate evidence of effective and diverse health networks in
both settings that utilize modified framing strategies to encourage
relatively fast transfer of these targets to their national setting
(Tumwesigye et al. 2013). However, given the timeframe for 90–
90–90 is very short (5 years), it could be argued that 2 years is too
slow for updating national strategies and policy guidelines.
Experience from the response to the Millennium Development
Goals found efforts to mobilize domestic resources in order to meet
the targets was insufficient across many countries (Ooms et al.
2010). In this analysis we find evidence of concerted efforts to mobi-
lise domestic revenue and to increase efficiency in the programme
response. Estimates for resource needs for the response in both
countries, however, indicate that despite these efforts, significant
resource gaps remain (Ghana AIDS Commission 2016; Uganda
AIDS Commission 2016). In Ghana and Uganda, it is not apparent
that MOH budgets for the HIV programme have changed as a con-
sequence of the targets or that resources have been reallocated from
other disease areas specifically to meet these targets. While more
investigation is needed, this finding could alleviate concerns that
targets displace funding from other parts of the health budget.
Instead, we indicate that these targets have resulted in a renewed
interest and focus on domestic resource mobilization mechanisms.
The adoption of novel domestic resource mobilization strategies is
likely influenced by a number of factors and not wholly attributable
to the 90–90–90 targets, such as the Abuja Declaration, which both
countries studied still fall short of. Whether other sub-Saharan
African countries exhibit similar responses is yet to be seen.
UNAIDS reported global progress to 90–90–90 at the mid-way
point to 2020 (UNAIDS 2017). While Botswana has already met the
targets, for most other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, there is a
substantial way to go. Whilst Ghana and Uganda demonstrate their
intentions to respond to 90–90 and ‘test and treat’, what will get
translated into practice on the ground is likely to suffer gaps
between intentions and actions. For the shift from nationwide scale
up to an approach that targets populations and geographies to have
the desired impact, there is requirement for a high degree of certi-
tude in where to target limited resources or for flexibility in realloca-
tion of resources should the evidence, upon which allocation
decisions have been made, change. PEPFAR are thought to have a
relatively high degree of flexibility in allocation of resources, com-
pared with domestic resources, as evidenced by their reconfiguration
in focus districts between Country Operational Plans 2015 and
2016 in Ghana and Uganda further to latest data on local epidemiol-
ogy or service use, respectively (PEPFAR Ghana 2015, 2016;
PEPFAR Uganda 2015, 2016). Uganda is now thought to be on
track to meet 90–90–90, perhaps as a substantial portion of the HIV
programme is funded by PEPFAR who with a degree of autonomy
can readily reallocate resources to areas of need or greatest impact.
We find the Dolowitz and Marsh framework valuable for ena-
bling consideration of differences in the response in two settings, but
limited in explanatory power for the differences between settings, in
particular, in regard to the role of actor networks. We find supple-
menting the Dolowitz and Marsh framework with the GHAPP use-
ful in considering a range of factors that influenced the effectiveness
of transfer. Through application of the GHAPP we see how lessons
are being drawn from mathematical modelling analyses with US
government agencies funding the provision of such technical assis-
tance. We consider there to be a growing epistemic community of
mathematical modellers arising in the HIV response; modellers pro-
vided the framework through which to consider how to eliminate
the AIDS epidemic (that is the 90–90–90 targets) and offer a frame-
work for considering how best to respond, thus driving national
application of such methods. Mathematical modelling studies that
demonstrate the cost effectiveness of ART scale up for test and treat
have been criticized for being ‘theoretically optimal, but practically
infeasible’ (Mikkelsen et al. 2017). In order for modelling to ration-
ally inform national programme planning and policy, analyses that
incorporate health system constraints are needed. Whether countries
that directly apply mathematical modelling to inform HIV pro-
gramme planning achieve greater impact than countries that do not,
may warrant investigation.
In this study, transfer appears to be based to a large extent on
the desire for international acceptance, to conform to social norms,
and for receipt of funding for the HIV programme. In the policy
transfer literature, Dolowitz and Marsh state their belief that trans-
fer based upon financial necessity or for international acceptance is
more likely coerced rather than voluntary, and thus may be more
likely to result in policy failure due to inappropriate transfer of the
policy to that context (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). We argue, how-
ever, that coerced transfer is not always inappropriate; the 90–90–
90 targets and associated policy content are based on research
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evidence and we do not find clear evidence that the targets have
diverted resources away from other important health issues (whether
such targets are still detrimental to attainment to goals of universal
health coverage remains unknown). However, it is clear that context
specific investigations need to be conducted and supported so that
decision-makers at the national level can ascertain how beneficial a
response is in terms of population health.
Follow-up with these countries would be advised to assess
whether domestic resource mobilization mechanisms are established
successfully and finances realized in the timeframe necessary to sup-
port 90–90–90. If funds are not realized it would be important to
ascertain which aspects of the HIV programme are not funded or
whether funds are later reallocated from other health issues in order
to meet these targets. Further, as it is apparent large gains are
intended from programme efficiencies, such as shifts to differenti-
ated models of care, facility level implementation studies would be
of value.
Limitations
In both countries, and across the African continent, reporting of
financial information for the HIV response has been limited and
inconsistent. Uganda’s last National AIDS Spending Assessment
covers up to 2010 only. Thus efforts to track funding allocations are
weak. Analysis of budgetary changes and health outcomes would
likely yield more information on the actual consequences of such
targets, but will not be feasible until tracking of expenditure is
institutionalized and routine. We therefore make a call for better
reporting on such information in order to improve decision-making
in the longer term. It was not possible to interview all desired indi-
viduals, in particular the Ministry of Finance, which would have
provided insight on internal allocation processes. When interviewing
senior representatives of organizations, as we did in our study, it can
be difficult to obtain an honest personal opinion rather than the
‘party line’. We consider the respondents to have been relatively
truthful, however, given that concerns were raised over realization
of resources and as statements were largely corroborated with the
document review.
Conclusions
The 90–90–90 targets have been transferred to the national pro-
gramme in Ghana and Uganda with evidence of a shift to more tar-
geted programming and reinvigoration of domestic resource
mobilization efforts. Differences in adoption of the targets between
the countries studied could be attributed to variation in the composi-
tion of the actor networks involved in the transfer of the targets and
the technical and financial resources available to them. Whether the
targets achieve significant traction in implementation and ultimately
the intended policy goal warrants follow-up. Improvements in rou-
tine collection and reporting of resource allocation and budgeting
for the HIV response are recommended in order to support quantita-
tive assessments of the influence of disease-specific targets on
national HIV programme activities and across health more broadly.
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